Free above: contract permissions, sell test and tax when data is available.
Paid report: pool balances, trading activity, large holders and estimated price impact for supported pools.
| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not found | Implementation code | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not found | Implementation code | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes | Proxy contract | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 71.7% | Holder distribution | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Holders | 105 | Token contract | 21 Nov 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x8ab4ff…00e148 |
| Current code | 0xe17ec1…063720 |
| Holders | 105 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0x8ab4ff…00e148 | 16.05% |
| #2 | 0x222aa5…cb2354 | 10.34% |
| #3 | 0xf4d65a…fbd2ac | 10.33% |
| #4 | 0xfd99a9…b65284 | 5.00% |
| #5 | 0xf609be…75a0bc | 5.00% |
This automated check scanned the CHAIN contract on Ethereum and scored it 12 out of 18. In plain terms, a simulated sale went through on the date of the check, with no buy or sell tax detected, and no admin minting, transfer-pausing, or blacklist functions were found in the current implementation code. That means, based solely on what the code allows right now, the contract owner does not appear able to block a holder from selling, freeze transfers, create new tokens out of thin air, or single out specific wallets. However, the contract uses an upgradeable proxy structure, which means the underlying logic can be swapped out by whoever controls the proxy. This is significant: it means that any of the protections just described (no mint, no pause, no blacklist) could change in the future if the implementation is replaced, even if none of those behaviours exist today. Holder concentration is also notable, with the top 10 wallets holding 71.7% of supply across 105 known holders, meaning price and liquidity could be heavily influenced by a small number of addresses. The source code itself is verified on the block explorer, which allows this kind of automated review to take place at all.
It's important to be clear about what this check does not cover. This is an automated read of contract mechanics only, run on a single date, against the code as it currently exists. It says nothing about who is behind the project, whether the team has a track record, how tokens are allocated or vested, whether there are legal or regulatory obligations attached to the project, or what the stated intentions of the upgrade rights actually are. No human has reviewed this contract, and the absence of a flag means that specific behaviour was not detected at the time of the check — not that it is permanently absent, especially given the proxy's upgradeability.
Before putting any money toward this token, it would be worth looking into who controls the proxy admin and whether that control sits behind a multisig or timelock, since that determines how easily the logic could be changed and by whom. It's also worth checking whether liquidity is locked and for how long, reviewing the identities and histories of the top holder wallets where possible, and looking for any independent audit reports or public documentation from the team explaining the purpose of the upgrade mechanism. Checking community discussion and the project's own disclosures alongside this technical scan would give a fuller picture than contract mechanics alone can provide.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
A deep check also reviews the project's public materials, team, tokenomics and disclosures.