| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Buy tax | No data | Contract | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Sell tax | No data | Contract | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not present | Contract | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Enabled | Contract | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 99.8% | Holder distribution | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Holders | 1839 | Token contract | 11 Sept 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x9fbc2b…549c2a |
| Current owner | 0x9fbc2b…549c2a |
| Holders | 1,839 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0x33aca0…bfa021 | 19.79% |
| #2 | 0x0f5fba…cdee37 | 13.74% |
| #3 | 0x168470…c6cc8a | 13.33% |
| #4 | 0xa51c76…146561 | 13.19% |
| #5 | 0x0caf72…382305 | 10.99% |
This automated check of the WBS (WebSea) contract on Polygon returned a score of 11 out of 18, based on contract mechanics detected on the date of the check. Two findings stand out. First, the contract includes a blacklisting function, which means whoever controls the contract's admin privileges has the technical ability to block specific wallet addresses from transferring or selling the token. This is a mechanic present in the code, not evidence that it has been used. Second, the top 10 holders control 99.8% of the total supply, an extremely high concentration. In practice this means a very small number of wallets could sell large amounts of WBS at once, which can move the price sharply and leaves other holders exposed to decisions made by a handful of addresses. On the positive side, no admin mint function was detected (so the owner cannot appear to freely create new tokens from the checked contract logic), transfers do not appear pausable, the contract is not an upgradeable proxy, and the source code is verified on the block explorer, meaning its logic can be independently read. A test transfer also completed successfully, indicating no honeypot behaviour was detected at the time of the check. Liquidity is not locked, however, which means whoever supplied the trading liquidity could withdraw it, potentially affecting the ability to buy or sell the token at a stable price.
It's important to be clear about what this check does not tell you. It only reads the contract's code and on-chain data — things like blacklist functions, mint permissions, holder distribution and liquidity status. It says nothing about the team behind WebSea, their intentions, the project's tokenomics or business model, whether any legal or regulatory structure exists, or whether marketing claims made elsewhere match what's on-chain. A contract can score well on mechanics and still be part of a project with weak fundamentals, and conversely, some flagged mechanics exist for legitimate operational reasons. This check does not assess intent, and no human has reviewed this specific token; the result is generated automatically.
Before considering any transaction, it would be worth looking into who holds the top wallets and whether any are known exchange or team addresses, checking whether the liquidity pool ownership and lock status can be verified independently on a site that tracks LP tokens, researching the team's public identity and track record, reading any available audit reports in full rather than relying on a summary, and checking community discussion for reports of blacklisting being applied to real holders. None of these steps guarantee an outcome, but they address areas this contract-level check cannot reach.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.