| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not present | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 62.8% | Holder distribution | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 92894 | Token contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x2460bc…20f1cd |
| Holders | 92,894 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · contract | 0x7a6a41…39bb53 | 15.34% |
| #2 · contract | 0x86b578…8c0161 | 10.94% |
| #3 | 0x95bf94…a4995e | 10.17% |
| #4 | 0xf10873…7e41ac | 5.46% |
| #5 | 0x5a52e9…70efcb | 4.45% |
This automated check looked at ETHFI's contract code and on-chain data as they stood on the date of the scan, scoring 14 out of 18. In practical terms, the findings indicate that the contract does not currently contain some of the mechanisms that would let an owner directly harm holders: there is no admin mint function detected, meaning the supply cannot be inflated at will; no pause function was found, so transfers cannot be frozen; no blacklist capability was detected, so individual addresses cannot be blocked from transacting; and the contract is not upgradeable, meaning its core logic cannot be swapped out after deployment. Buy and sell taxes both read 0%, and a transfer simulation indicates the token is sellable, which together suggest no honeypot behaviour was detected at the time of the check. The contract source is verified on the block explorer, which means the published code can be read and checked against what actually runs on-chain.
Two points lower down the findings list are worth sitting with rather than skimming past. Top-10 wallets hold 62.8% of supply, which is a high concentration — if a small number of holders move large amounts, it can affect the market independently of anything to do with contract safety. Liquidity is not locked, though the report notes this is typical for large, established tokens where the main pool is spread across 106 separate liquidity providers rather than one party who could pull it all at once; this is a different risk profile from an unlocked pool with a single provider, but it's not the same as a formal lock either.
What this check does not do is assess ether.fi as a project, a team, or a business. It reads contract mechanics only — it says nothing about who controls the top wallets, whether token distribution or vesting schedules are reasonable, whether there's a functioning legal entity behind the project, or whether anyone involved has good or bad intent. A clean contract reading is not a judgement on the people or plans behind it.
Before putting money in, it's worth looking independently at who the top-10 holders actually are (team, treasury, exchange wallets, or unknown addresses), checking ether.fi's own documentation for token allocation and vesting terms, reviewing audit reports from named firms if any exist, and confirming the contract address you're interacting with matches the official one published by the project itself.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.