| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | ChainSift simulation | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | ChainSift simulation | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not found | Implementation code | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Enabled | Implementation code | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes — a 3-of-5 multisig can replace the code | Proxy contract | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 74.9% | Holder distribution | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 85116 | Token contract | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x97f1f8…f921e3 |
| Code can be replaced by | 0x5be9a4…957dbb — a 3-of-5 multisig |
| Current code | 0x73fe14…48fde7 |
| Holders | 85,116 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · contract | 0x5be9a4…957dbb | 40.44% |
| #2 | 0x1246e4…3830ad | 15.75% |
| #3 · contract | 0xee7f7f…a174dc | 3.75% |
| #4 · contract | 0xf32e35…134748 | 3.19% |
| #5 | 0x5ab261…5fda74 | 3.00% |
This automated check found that the WLFI contract includes a blacklist function, meaning whoever controls the contract can block specific wallet addresses from transferring or selling their tokens. It also sits behind an upgradeable proxy, controlled by a 3-of-5 multisig wallet. In practice, this means a majority of five key-holders could vote to replace the entire contract's code at any time — including removing the blacklist, adding new restrictions, or changing how the token behaves altogether. On the date of this check, no admin mint function was found, meaning no mechanism was detected that would let the owner create new tokens out of thin air, and no pause function was detected either, meaning there's currently no identified way to freeze all transfers network-wide. Simulated buy and sell transactions both completed successfully with 0% tax, and no honeypot behaviour was detected during the simulation. Separately, the top ten wallets hold 74.9% of the total supply, which is a high concentration — meaning the trading behaviour of a small number of holders could have an outsized effect on price movement.
What this check does not tell you is arguably just as important. This is a purely automated read of the contract's code and on-chain structure — it says nothing about who is behind the multisig keys, what WLFI's team intends to do with upgrade powers, whether the project's tokenomics or vesting schedules are sound, or whether any legal or regulatory structure sits behind the token. Source code being verified means the code is readable, not that it is good or that it reflects honest intent. No part of this process involved a human reviewer forming a judgement about the project's legitimacy or prospects.
Before considering any transaction, it's worth independently verifying who holds the multisig keys and what governance process, if any, surrounds upgrade decisions. Reviewing the project's own documentation on blacklist policy — when and why it might be used — is also sensible, since the capability itself doesn't indicate intent. It's worth checking holder distribution over time rather than at a single snapshot, looking into whether large holders are exchanges, team wallets, or locked contracts, and researching the team's public identity and track record through independent sources. None of this check's findings should be read as a judgement on whether WLFI is a reasonable holding — it only describes mechanics that were detected in the contract as it exists today.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.