| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | No data | Transfer simulation | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | No data | Contract | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | No data | Contract | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not found | Implementation code | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not found | Implementation code | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes | Proxy contract | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 75.1% | Holder distribution | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 153 | Token contract | 13 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0xe2814f…37f194 |
| Current code | 0xe72e80…6989e6 |
| Holders | 153 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0xe2814f…37f194 | 19.02% |
| #2 | 0x0956c5…afc480 | 11.35% |
| #3 | 0x83e196…4d91b0 | 9.74% |
| #4 | 0xe6cbcf…c01a20 | 5.00% |
| #5 | 0x733bb4…96dc40 | 5.00% |
This automated check scored CHAIN 5 out of 10, and the findings describe what the contract's code currently allows — not what its owner intends to do with it. The most significant flag is that the contract uses an upgradeable proxy, which means the logic governing the token can be swapped out after you've bought in. In practice, this gives whoever controls the proxy the ability to change how the token behaves entirely, including introducing mechanics like minting, pausing transfers, or blacklisting addresses, even if none of those functions are present in the code as it stands today. Separately, no admin mint, transfer-pausing, or address-blacklisting functions were found in the implementation code checked on the date of this scan, and the contract source is verified on the block explorer, meaning the code is publicly readable and matches what's deployed. However, the data source did not report on the contract's broader function set, so that portion was not scored, and sellability and buy/sell tax data were unavailable from transfer simulation and contract sources at the time of the check. Holder concentration is notably high: the top 10 wallets hold 75.1% of total supply across only 153 known holders, which means a small number of addresses could materially affect price through coordinated or individual selling.
It's important to be clear about what this check does not cover. This is an automated read of contract mechanics only — it does not assess who is behind the project, how tokens were allocated or vested, whether there are legal or regulatory obligations attached, or whether the team's stated intentions match what the code permits. A verified, non-malicious-looking contract can still sit behind a team with no track record, an unsustainable token model, or outright bad intent, none of which shows up in bytecode.
Before considering any transaction, it's worth independently verifying sellability by checking recent sell transactions on the block explorer, since this check couldn't confirm it through simulation. Look into who holds the top wallets and whether any are exchange or liquidity addresses rather than individual holders, as that changes the concentration picture. Check whether the proxy's upgrade authority is held by a single wallet, a multisig, or a time-locked contract, since that affects how much warning holders would have before any logic change. Finally, research the team's identity, any audits conducted by named third parties, and the project's documented tokenomics before forming a view.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 10 points out of 100.
The other 90 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.