| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not present | Contract | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Enabled | Contract | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 55.4% | Holder distribution | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | 100% burned | LP holders | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Holders | 156 | Token contract | 29 Sept 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x842ecb…f06ee1 |
| Current owner | None — ownership renounced |
| Holders | 156 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · UniswapV2 · contract | 0x5dc770…64fc42 | 29.68% |
| #2 · contract | 0x009a8d…881b57 | 4.85% |
| #3 | 0xb152ea…ab3299 | 3.71% |
| #4 · contract | 0x3aafe9…4a2eea | 3.26% |
| #5 | 0x645c79…d781a2 | 2.66% |
This automated check of WILDEBEEST returned 13 out of 18, with a few findings worth translating into plain terms. The contract includes a blacklist function, which means whoever controls the contract retains the ability to block specific wallet addresses from transacting with the token. That capability was not detected to be in use at the time of this check, but its presence in the code means it could be activated later. On the more reassuring side, no admin mint function was detected, meaning the owner does not appear able to create new tokens out of thin air and dilute holders; no pause function was detected, meaning transfers cannot currently be frozen contract-wide; and the contract is not upgradeable, so its core logic cannot be silently swapped out later. Buy and sell tax are both recorded at 0%, and a transfer simulation found the token sellable, meaning no honeypot behaviour was detected on the date of this check. Liquidity being 100% burned means the liquidity pool tokens have been sent to a dead address, which reduces (though does not eliminate) the risk of the pool being pulled by whoever added it. Holder concentration, however, is notable: the top 10 wallets hold 55.4% of supply, meaning a small number of addresses could move a large share of tokens at once, which can affect price sharply if they choose to sell.
It's important to be clear about what this check does not cover. This is an automated read of the contract's code and on-chain data only — it does not assess who the team is, whether they are anonymous, what their track record looks like, how the token's economics are designed to function over time, whether any legal or regulatory structure sits behind the project, or what the team's actual intentions are. A verified source and a clean set of contract mechanics say nothing about whether the people behind the token plan to support it, abandon it, or manage it responsibly. No part of this process involved a human reviewer forming a judgement — it is a mechanical scan of contract behaviour as it stood on the date checked.
Before considering any transaction, it would be worth looking into who the team is and whether they're identifiable, reading whatever documentation or whitepaper exists for how the token is meant to be used, checking whether the contract owner's wallet still holds special privileges (such as the blacklist function) and whether ownership has been renounced, watching how the 156 holders and top-10 concentration evolve over time, and checking transaction history for any prior use of the blacklist capability. Findings here reflect a single point-in-time automated scan and can change if the contract owner takes further action.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.