| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not found | Implementation code | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not found | Implementation code | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes — a timelock with a 30-day delay can replace the code | Proxy contract | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 100% | Holder distribution | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 1 | Token contract | 28 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0xc1ab5a…a76b52 |
| Code can be replaced by | 0x000000…63b709 — a timelock with a 30-day delay |
| Current code | 0x9c8507…cba96f |
| Holders | 1 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · contract | 0x000000…63b709 | 100.00% |
This automated check found that CAP's contract is an upgradeable proxy, meaning the underlying code can be replaced by whoever controls the timelock contract. In this case, that process carries a 30-day delay, so changes cannot happen instantly, but the practical effect is that every other finding on this page — tax rates, mint behaviour, pause or blacklist functions — could be altered in the future even if nothing concerning is present today. No admin mint function, transfer-pausing mechanism, or address blacklist was found in the implementation code at the time of this check, and the simulation did not detect honeypot behaviour (the token was sellable with 0% buy and sell tax). The contract source is verified on the block explorer, which allows the code to be read but does not by itself indicate anything about intent. Separately, the holder data shows the top 10 holders control 100% of supply, and only one holder address was detected in total — this points to extremely concentrated ownership and, combined with the upgradeability, means a very small number of parties currently hold both the tokens and the ability to change contract rules.
It's important to be clear about what this check does not cover. This is an automated read of contract mechanics only — it does not assess who the team behind CAP is, whether they are identifiable or anonymous, how the token's supply or incentives are structured, whether any legal entity stands behind the project, or what their stated or actual intentions are. A clean mechanical read does not mean a project is sound, and flags like upgradeability or concentration do not by themselves mean harm is intended — they simply describe what the contract currently allows and what the holder data currently shows, as of the date of this check.
Before putting any money in, it would be worth looking into who controls the timelock and multisig behind the upgrade mechanism, and whether that control is publicly documented or doxxed. It's also worth checking whether the single holder address identified is a known exchange, liquidity pool, or team wallet, since that changes the meaning of "100% concentration" considerably. Looking for independent discussion of the project, any audit reports from named third parties, and the liquidity lock status on the trading pair would add further context. None of this is available from contract code alone, and none of it is something this automated check is able to confirm.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.