| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | ChainSift simulation | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | ChainSift simulation | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Enabled | Implementation code | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not found | Implementation code | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes — a 3-of-5 multisig can replace the code | Proxy contract | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 100% | Holder distribution | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 3 | Token contract | 27 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x826e0b…c153ba |
| Code can be replaced by | 0x715b1d…8d0bb0 — a 3-of-5 multisig |
| Current code | 0xffa796…9c5d79 |
| Holders | 3 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · contract | 0x715b1d…8d0bb0 | 95.60% |
| #2 · contract | 0x477f48…6544df | 4.00% |
| #3 · contract | 0x9ca33d…b74a43 | 0.40% |
This automated check scored ENSO 9 out of 18, and the findings describe specific technical abilities the contract grants, not a verdict on the token. The contract owner can mint new tokens at will, which means the total supply is not fixed and existing holdings can be diluted at any time. The contract also sits behind an upgradeable proxy controlled by a 3-of-5 multisig, meaning that a majority of five signers can replace the underlying contract code entirely — including removing or changing any of the mechanics listed here, such as adding a sell tax, a transfer pause, or a blacklist in future, even though none of those are present today. Separately, the simulation run on the date of this check found the token sellable with no buy or sell tax and no honeypot behaviour detected, and the source code is verified on the block explorer, which allows this kind of automated reading in the first place. The holder data, however, shows only three holders in total, with the top ten (in this case, effectively all holders) controlling 100% of supply — a level of concentration that means price and liquidity could be heavily influenced by a very small number of wallets.
What this check does not tell you is anything about who is behind the project, what they intend to do with the mint or upgrade functions, whether there is a roadmap or working product, how tokens are allocated or vested, or whether any legal entity stands behind the token. Those are questions about team, tokenomics, and intent, and they sit entirely outside what a contract-mechanics scan can see. A verified, mintable, upgradeable contract with concentrated holdings is not inherently evidence of wrongdoing, just as an absence of flags today is not a guarantee the contract will stay as it is tomorrow — upgradeability in particular means the rules can change after the fact.
Before putting any money in, it would be worth looking into who controls the 3-of-5 multisig and whether those signers are publicly identified or linked to a known team, checking whether there is a public token allocation or vesting schedule that explains why only three wallets hold the entire supply, searching for any audit reports or security reviews of the implementation contract, and looking at whether the project has any public communication, documentation, or history beyond the contract itself. None of this check constitutes financial advice, and the findings reflect only what was detectable in the contract code on the date the check was run.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.