| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Enabled | Implementation code | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Enabled | Implementation code | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes — another contract can replace the code | Proxy contract | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 57.7% | Holder distribution | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 63405 | Token contract | 20 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x341a38…ed07ff |
| Code can be replaced by | 0xc6cde7…1ea828 — another contract |
| Current code | 0x4c0d2c…f9e566 |
| Holders | 63,405 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0x73f17d…3ac32e | 18.02% |
| #2 | 0x575428…07b949 | 11.84% |
| #3 | 0x785f04…4eff76 | 4.93% |
| #4 | 0xf9b356…098057 | 4.62% |
| #5 | 0x79ee72…d7b74f | 4.40% |
This automated check scored XAUt 10 out of 18 on contract mechanics, and each finding points to a specific capability rather than a verdict on the token itself. The contract's admin can mint new supply, which means the total number of tokens in circulation can be increased at the owner's discretion, potentially affecting existing holders' share of that supply. The contract also supports blacklisting, meaning specific wallet addresses can be blocked from transacting with the token if the admin chooses to do so. It is built as an upgradeable proxy, which is a significant structural point: the underlying code governing all of these behaviours, including mint and blacklist functions, can be swapped out by the contract owner at a later date without holders needing to approve the change. Buy and sell taxes were both found to be 0%, and no honeypot behaviour was detected in ChainSift's simulation — the token was sellable at the time of the check. Liquidity was found to not be locked, meaning whoever supplied the trading pool could withdraw it. Holder concentration is notable, with the top 10 addresses controlling 57.7% of supply. The contract source code is verified on the block explorer, which allows anyone to read the logic being described here.
What this check does not tell you is just as important. It reads contract mechanics only — it has no view into who operates the project, how token supply is intended to be used over time, whether any legal entity stands behind it, or what the stated purpose and roadmap are. A token can score well on mechanics while still carrying risk from concentrated control, opaque governance, or business practices that no automated scan can see. Nothing here assesses the intent of the people or entity behind the contract, and nothing here should be read as a judgement of them.
Before putting money in, it's worth looking directly at who holds the admin and upgrade keys for this contract — whether that's a single wallet, a multisig, or a named custodian — since that address effectively controls the mint, blacklist and upgrade functions described above. It's also worth checking whether the project publishes independent reserve attestations or audits, given this token is marketed as backed by a physical asset, and reading the terms under which the issuer can freeze or seize tokens. Reviewing the liquidity pool directly on-chain to see who holds the LP position, and checking for any public statements from the issuer about mint history and upgrade changes, would also add useful context this check does not cover.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.