| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not present | Contract | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Owner renounced — no one can pause | ChainSift simulation | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Balances | Changeable — whoever controls the contract can take tokens from any wallet | Contract | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 8.7% | Holder distribution | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | 100% burned | LP holders | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 356 | Token contract | 24 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x80e56a…89b523 |
| Current owner | None — ownership renounced |
| Holders | 356 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · UniswapV2 · contract | 0x8535a2…becccd | 4.75% |
| #2 | 0xe145b4…65b251 | 0.44% |
| #3 | 0x6ce9e1…08867d | 0.44% |
| #4 | 0x12ec8f…1f91cb | 0.44% |
| #5 | 0x73830a…c04f54 | 0.44% |
This automated check scanned GROKLET's contract on Ethereum and found several functions that would normally give the contract owner significant control over holders — things like pausing transfers, changing wallet limits, adjusting fees, or blacklisting addresses. In this case, however, ownership has been renounced, meaning no wallet currently holds the keys to use these functions. The one exception worth flagging clearly: the contract still contains a mechanism that could let whoever controls it change balances directly, effectively moving tokens out of a holder's wallet without their action. Since ownership is renounced, this cannot currently be exercised by anyone — but it's a capability baked into the code, not something the check can rule out being reactivated if control were somehow regained. Alongside this, no honeypot behaviour was detected: the simulation showed the token can be sold, buy and sell tax are both set at 0%, no admin minting function was found, and no blacklist is present. Liquidity is reported as 100% burned, and the top 10 holders combined hold 8.7% of supply, which is a relatively low concentration. The contract source is verified on the block explorer, meaning the code matches what's publicly viewable.
It's important to understand what this check does not cover. It reads contract mechanics only — the literal code and what it technically allows. It says nothing about who the team behind GROKLET is, whether their stated plans match their actions, how tokenomics might play out over time, whether any legal or regulatory structure applies, or what the people deploying this token actually intend to do with it. A clean mechanical reading does not mean the people involved are trustworthy, and a contract with concerning functions doesn't necessarily mean bad intent either — context matters, and this tool doesn't assess context.
Before putting any money in, it's worth independently verifying a few things: check the renouncement transaction yourself on the block explorer to confirm ownership really was given up and to which address (sometimes "renounced" points to another controlled wallet); look at the liquidity lock or burn transaction directly rather than taking a label at face value; research the team or project's public presence, communications, and history; and review the holder list for any wallets that look like they belong to the deployer or related parties, even below the top-10 threshold. None of this guarantees an outcome one way or another — it simply gives you more information than a contract-level scan alone can provide.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.