| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Enabled | Implementation code | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not found | Implementation code | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes — a 6-of-10 multisig can replace the code | Proxy contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 62.9% | Holder distribution | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 22892 | Token contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x937ce2…8afed5 |
| Code can be replaced by | 0xcba28b…4f9afa — a 6-of-10 multisig |
| Current code | 0x4364fd…c24852 |
| Holders | 22,892 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · contract | 0x9d03bb…0e5123 | 38.58% |
| #2 · contract | 0x6abfd6…aaf6a2 | 7.93% |
| #3 · contract | 0x53051e…79b281 | 4.16% |
| #4 | 0x72b23a…696fae | 2.86% |
| #5 · contract | 0x3154cf…0f2c35 | 2.55% |
This automated check of the MORPHO contract on Ethereum returned a score of 11 out of 18, based on contract mechanics detected on the date of the check. A few findings are worth translating into plain terms. The contract allows the owner to mint new tokens at will, which means total supply can be increased after you buy, diluting existing holders. The contract is also an upgradeable proxy controlled by a 6-of-10 multisig, meaning that if six of those ten key-holders agree, they can replace the underlying contract code entirely — including changing or removing any of the mechanics listed in this report, such as the minting function or the lack of a blacklist or pause function. No transfer-pausing or address-blacklisting capability was detected in the current implementation, and selling was successfully simulated with 0% buy and sell tax, meaning no honeypot behaviour was detected on this check. Top-10 wallets were found to hold 63.4% of supply, which is a concentration level that means a small number of holders could influence price materially through large sales. Liquidity was not found to be locked, meaning liquidity providers retain the ability to withdraw it from the pool.
It's important to be clear about what this check does not do. This is an automated read of contract code and on-chain data only — it has not been reviewed by a human analyst. It says nothing about who is behind the project, whether the multisig signers are trustworthy or independent, how the mint function or upgrade powers are actually intended to be used, what the token's broader economic design or vesting schedule looks like, or whether any legal, regulatory or business claims made by the team hold up. A high or low score here reflects contract-level risk indicators, not an assessment of the project's legitimacy, team conduct, or future intent.
Before putting money in, it's worth looking into who holds the multisig keys and whether that information is publicly disclosed, checking whether there's a timelock on upgrades or minting that would give holders warning before changes take effect, reviewing the token's official documentation or audits for explanation of why mint and upgrade functions exist, looking at how the top holders' tokens are distributed (team, treasury, exchanges, or individual wallets), and checking the liquidity pool directly on a chain explorer to see who controls it and under what conditions it could be withdrawn.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.