| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Admin mint | Enabled | Contract | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 60.7% | Holder distribution | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 3 Sept 2026 |
| Holders | 99664 | Token contract | 3 Sept 2026 |
This automated check on ENA returned a score of 12 out of 18, based on contract mechanics observed on the date of the scan. Here is what the findings actually mean for a holder. The contract's admin mint function is enabled, which means whoever controls the owner privileges can create new tokens at will — this can dilute existing holders' share of supply without their consent. No transfer-pausing function or address blacklist was detected, meaning the contract does not currently appear to give the owner a way to freeze transfers or block specific wallets from moving tokens. Buy and sell tax are both 0%, and a transfer simulation indicated the token is sellable, so no honeypot behaviour was detected in this test. The contract is not an upgradeable proxy, meaning its core logic cannot be swapped out after deployment. Source code is verified on the block explorer, allowing anyone to read the actual logic being executed rather than relying on marketing claims. On the more cautionary side, the top 10 holders control 60.7% of supply, a concentration level that means large wallets could move markets significantly if they sell, and liquidity is not locked, meaning whoever controls the liquidity pool could withdraw it.
It is important to be clear about what this check does not tell you. This is an automated read of contract code and on-chain data only — it does not assess who the team behind ENA is, whether they have a track record, how tokenomics or vesting schedules are structured, whether any legal entity stands behind the project, or what the stated intent of the mint function is. A mint function being technically present does not tell you whether it is used for routine protocol operations, has a multisig or timelock attached, or could be exploited unilaterally. No human has reviewed this contract or the surrounding project; the findings above are purely mechanical.
Before putting money in, it would be worth checking who holds the admin/owner keys for ENA and whether that role sits behind a multisig or timelock, since this affects how the mint function could realistically be used. It's also worth looking at where the top holders' tokens sit — exchange wallets, team vesting contracts, or unrelated private wallets carry different implications. Checking the liquidity pool address directly, on a block explorer or a locker service, would clarify how exposed the pool is to withdrawal. Reviewing official project documentation, audit reports if any exist, and community discussion of governance decisions would add context this check cannot provide.
Contracts change after they are checked. Leave an email or a Telegram chat ID and we will tell you the moment this one does — taxes raised, minting switched on, liquidity unlocked. Free for three contracts, no account and no password.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.