| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Admin mint | Enabled | Contract | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Enabled | Contract | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 79.4% | Holder distribution | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Holders | 103243 | Token contract | 7 Sept 2026 |
| Contract deployed | 25 Oct 2023 — 1,049 days ago |
| Deployment transaction | 0x2a88c5…d673bd |
| Deployed by | 0xb8d66f…7ca62f |
| Holders | 103,243 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0x5e3ef2…13d908 | 33.90% |
| #2 | 0x401f6c…21188b | 29.59% |
| #3 | 0x29e7df…0e2c4e | 3.55% |
| #4 | 0xf97781…41acec | 3.41% |
| #5 | 0x5a52e9…70efcb | 2.24% |
This automated check found that the contract for POL carries a mix of standard and elevated-risk mechanics. The most significant finding is that admin mint is enabled, meaning whoever controls the owner address can create new tokens at will, which can dilute existing holders' share of supply. Transfers pausable was also detected as enabled, which means the owner has the technical ability to freeze some or all token transfers, temporarily preventing holders from moving or selling their tokens. No blacklist function and no upgradeable proxy were detected on the date of this check, which limits some other forms of owner control, such as blocking specific addresses or silently changing the contract's logic after deployment. Transfer simulation indicated the token is sellable, and buy/sell tax was read from the contract as 0%, meaning no automatic fee was detected on trades at the time of the check. Separately, top-10 wallets were found to hold 79.4% of supply, a concentration level that means a small number of addresses could materially affect price if they were to sell. Liquidity was also found not to be locked, meaning whoever controls the liquidity pool retains the technical ability to withdraw it.
It's worth being clear about what this check does not cover. This is an automated read of contract code and on-chain data only — it does not assess who the team behind the token is, their track record, the token's economic design, any legal or regulatory structure, or the intent behind the mint and pause functions that were detected. A verified source (as found here) means the code is human-readable on the block explorer; it does not mean the code has been audited or that its behaviour has been judged safe by any reviewer, human or otherwise. Enabled permissions like mint or pause are common in many legitimate projects for operational reasons, and their mere presence is not evidence of intent to misuse them.
Given these findings, a next concrete step would be to look at who controls the owner address — whether it is a single private key, a multisig, or a time-locked contract — since that materially changes how the mint and pause functions could be used in practice. It would also be worth reviewing the project's own documentation or governance forum for any stated policy on minting, pausing, or liquidity management, checking the history of the top-10 holder wallets for prior large sales, and confirming liquidity lock status directly on the relevant DEX or lock-service page, since that can change over time independently of this check.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.