| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Enabled | Implementation code | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Enabled | Implementation code | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not found | Implementation code | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes — a timelock with a 2-day delay can replace the code | Proxy contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 86% | Holder distribution | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 694 | Token contract | 23 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x986868…6579b2 |
| Code can be replaced by | 0x0eea1e…95639b — a timelock with a 2-day delay |
| Current code | 0xc233a5…aae010 |
| Holders | 694 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0xe7761a…e2cf78 | 61.20% |
| #2 · UniswapV3 · contract | 0x155738…400127 | 13.27% |
| #3 · contract | 0x140022…187dab | 2.79% |
| #4 | 0xeacf48…389e0e | 1.69% |
| #5 · contract | 0x72fad4…54ff79 | 1.50% |
This automated check scored CHIP 9 out of 18 on contract mechanics, based on what was detectable on the date of the scan. A few of these findings are worth translating into plain terms. The contract owner can mint new tokens at will, which means the total supply is not fixed and can be increased without holders' consent. The owner can also pause transfers, meaning holders could, at some point, find themselves unable to move or sell their tokens while a pause is active. The contract is also upgradeable through a proxy pattern: a timelock with a two-day delay sits in front of any code change, so upgrades are not instant, but after that delay the owner can replace the underlying contract logic entirely, including the mint and pause behaviours described here, or anything else in the code. Separately, the top ten wallet addresses hold 85.9% of the supply, which is a high concentration — large sales from any of these holders could have an outsized effect on price and available liquidity. On the more reassuring side, no honeypot behaviour was detected: the simulation found the token sellable, with 0% buy and sell tax, and no address blacklist was found in the implementation code at the time of the check. The contract source is also verified on the block explorer, which allows anyone to read the actual code rather than relying on bytecode alone. Liquidity is not locked, meaning whoever supplied the trading pool could withdraw it, which would affect the ability to trade the token at a given price.
What this check does not tell you is just as important as what it does. This is an automated read of contract mechanics only — it says nothing about who is behind the project, how tokens are allocated or vested, whether there is a working product, what the team has said publicly, or whether any of the permissions described above have been or will be used responsibly. No human has reviewed this project, and intent cannot be inferred from code alone.
Before putting money into this token, it would be worth looking into who controls the owner and timelock addresses and whether that control sits with a multisig or a single key, checking the token's liquidity pool directly to confirm how much is there and whether it is genuinely locked elsewhere, reviewing the project's own documentation and communications for an explanation of why minting and pausing exist, and looking at the holder list to see whether the top ten addresses are exchanges, team wallets, or unrelated individual holders.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.