| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Enabled | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 17.7% | Holder distribution | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 0 | Token contract | 21 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x970609…9773af |
| Current owner | 0xf68a4b…fef62d |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0x8894e0…e2d4e3 | 4.89% |
| #2 | 0xf97781…41acec | 4.19% |
| #3 | 0x5a52e9…70efcb | 3.27% |
| #4 · contract | 0x8932fe…595f71 | 1.31% |
| #5 · contract | 0x128463…a87974 | 0.83% |
This automated check scored this contract 16 out of 18, and the findings describe what the contract's code technically allows, not what its operators intend to do. The most relevant flag here is that admin minting is enabled, which means whoever holds the owner privileges can create new tokens at will. In practice this matters because new supply can dilute existing holders' share of the total, and if minting is used aggressively it could affect the token's value independent of demand. On the positive side, no pausable transfer function and no address blacklist were detected on the date of this check, meaning the contract does not currently contain code that would let an owner freeze transfers or block specific wallets from moving tokens. Sell simulation also returned no honeypot behaviour, with buy and sell tax both reading 0%, and the contract is not an upgradeable proxy, meaning its core logic cannot be swapped out later without deploying a new contract. Top-10 wallets hold 17.7% of supply, a concentration figure worth noting but not inherently alarming on its own. Source code is verified on the block explorer, which allows anyone, including this automated tool, to read the actual logic rather than relying on unverified bytecode.
What this check does not tell you is just as important. It reads contract mechanics only: it cannot assess who controls the admin keys, whether those keys sit behind a multisig or timelock, what the team's track record or identity is, how token supply is allocated or vested, whether there is a working product behind the token, or whether any legal or regulatory structure applies. A contract can score well on mechanics while still carrying risk from concentrated ownership, opaque team control, or business factors entirely outside the code. Nothing here is a judgement on intent, and no human has reviewed this contract or its surrounding project.
Before treating any of this as reassurance, it's worth looking at who holds the admin/owner wallet and whether it's a multisig, checking whether mint events have occurred historically and at what volume, reviewing the project's own documentation for how minting authority is meant to be used, and looking at holder distribution trends over time rather than a single snapshot. Independent research into the team, audits by third parties, and the token's actual circulating supply history would all sit outside what this automated check can confirm.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.