| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not present | Contract | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 73.8% | Holder distribution | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 68048 | Token contract | 25 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0xdde09d…876797 |
| Holders | 68,048 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0x19295e…134524 | 29.09% |
| #2 | 0x5eb538…f624d3 | 9.72% |
| #3 | 0xf724ac…35e361 | 7.27% |
| #4 · burned | 0x000000…00dead | 5.13% |
| #5 | 0x18f1f7…30264d | 4.00% |
This automated check looked at the contract code and on-chain data for USDT.z on BSC and scored it 13 out of 18. In practical terms, several owner-side controls that could be used against holders were not detected on the date of this check: there is no admin mint function (so the owner cannot create new tokens out of thin air and dilute holders), transfers are not pausable (so the contract cannot be frozen to trap funds), there is no address blacklist function (so individual wallets cannot be blocked from moving tokens), and the contract is not an upgradeable proxy (so the underlying logic cannot be swapped out later for something stricter). Buy and sell tax both read as 0%, and a transfer simulation found the token sellable, meaning no honeypot behaviour — a setup where tokens can be bought but not resold — was detected at the time of testing. The contract source code is also verified on the block explorer, which means the code is publicly readable rather than hidden.
Two points pull the score down. Liquidity is not locked, which means whoever supplied the trading pool could withdraw it, and top-10 holders currently control 73.8% of supply, a concentration level where a small number of wallets moving tokens could affect the market meaningfully. Neither of these is a mechanism built into the contract itself, but both describe who currently holds practical power over the token's liquidity and supply distribution.
It's worth being clear about what this check does not cover. It only reads contract mechanics and on-chain data as they exist right now — it says nothing about who the team behind this bridged token is, how the project is funded or structured, what the token's broader economics or roadmap look like, or whether the stated purpose (a bridged version of Tether on the ZED20 chain) is actually backed as claimed. No human has reviewed this token, and nothing here should be read as a judgement on intent.
Before putting money toward this token, it would be worth independently verifying the bridge or custodian backing USDT.z, checking who controls the liquidity pool and whether that address has a history of removing funds, looking at whether the top holder wallets are exchanges, contracts, or individual addresses, and searching for any independent audit or community discussion of this specific bridged asset rather than relying on contract checks alone.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.