| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not present | Contract | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 100% | Holder distribution | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 7 | Token contract | 26 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x6b2c9e…6401c4 |
| Current owner | 0x6b2c9e…6401c4 |
| Holders | 7 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 | 0x6b2c9e…6401c4 | 99.99% |
| #2 · contract | 0x6402c0…7633d4 | 0.00% |
| #3 · contract | 0xcec6b3…f6475b | 0.00% |
| #4 | 0x24146e…bb99d2 | 0.00% |
| #5 · contract | 0xdb0c81…7f792c | 0.00% |
This automated check found that QMSNETWORK's contract does not currently contain some of the mechanisms that are most commonly used to trap or drain holders. A test transfer simulation showed the token can be sold, buy and sell tax are both set to 0%, and no admin minting function, transfer-pausing switch, or address blacklist was detected in the contract code on the date of this check. The contract is also not upgradeable, meaning the underlying logic cannot be swapped out later through a proxy. The contract source is verified on the block explorer, which means the code is publicly readable and matches what was deployed, rather than being hidden.
That said, two things in the evidence table stand out. The top 10 holders control 100% of supply, and there are only 7 holders in total, which means a tiny number of wallets effectively hold all of the tokens in circulation. Liquidity is also not locked, meaning whoever controls the liquidity pool could remove it at any time, which would make the token difficult or impossible to sell at a reasonable price even though no honeypot behaviour was detected in the contract itself. These two conditions together represent a concentration and liquidity risk that sits outside what "no malicious code found" can tell you.
It's important to be clear about what this check does not cover. This is an automated read of the contract's mechanics as they exist on-chain today — it does not assess who is behind the project, their track record, their stated plans, the token's distribution schedule, any marketing claims, or whether there is a legal entity standing behind it. No human has reviewed this project, and a clean reading of the contract code says nothing about the intentions of the people controlling it or the wallets holding the supply.
Before putting any money in, it would be worth looking at who holds those top wallets and whether any of them are known exchange, team, or developer addresses, since that context isn't visible from holder percentages alone. It's also worth checking the liquidity pool directly on-chain to see whether it's locked or owned by a wallet that could withdraw it, independently confirming what's shown here. Given that liquidity is unlocked and ownership is this concentrated, treating the practical ability to exit a position as uncertain, rather than assumed, would be a reasonable starting point for further research.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.