| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | ChainSift simulation | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not found | Implementation code | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not found | Implementation code | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not found | Implementation code | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | Yes — a 2-of-3 multisig can replace the code | Proxy contract | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 87.6% | Holder distribution | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 19844 | Token contract | 18 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x8d9b4c…99e489 |
| Code can be replaced by | 0x4d6f16…22f27e — a 2-of-3 multisig |
| Current code | 0x38b289…4d06a5 |
| Holders | 19,844 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · contract | 0x73d8bd…4946db | 34.81% |
| #2 | 0x21960f…69a0fc | 24.71% |
| #3 | 0x3c274b…2cd396 | 11.12% |
| #4 · contract | 0x238a35…d5e6c4 | 10.95% |
| #5 | 0x34219b…dd22aa | 1.38% |
This automated check scored CT at 12 out of 18, and the findings describe what the contract's code currently allows, not what it will do. The most significant finding is that CT runs on an upgradeable proxy controlled by a 2-of-3 multisig: this means the three key-holders, if two of them agree, can replace the entire contract logic at any time, including introducing mint functions, pausability, blacklisting, or tax changes that are not present today. Everything else listed in this check — no admin mint found, no pause function found, no blacklist found, 0% buy and sell tax — reflects the contract as it exists on the date of this check, and all of it could be altered through that upgrade path. Separately, liquidity is not locked, meaning whoever holds the liquidity pool tokens could withdraw the paired assets from the trading pool at any time, which can sharply reduce the ability to sell. The top 10 wallets holding 88.1% of supply is a concentration indicator: it means a small number of addresses could move large amounts of the token at once, which can affect price and available liquidity, independent of anything the contract code does. Source verification being present just means the code on the explorer matches what is deployed, so it could be read and checked at all — it says nothing about whether that code is reassuring.
It's worth being clear about what this check does not cover. This is an automated read of contract mechanics only — it does not assess who the team behind CT is, whether they have a track record, how tokenomics are structured, whether any legal entity stands behind the project, or what their intentions are. No human has reviewed this project, and nothing here speaks to whether the project is trustworthy, viable, or likely to succeed or fail.
Before putting money into CT, it would be worth looking into who controls the 2-of-3 multisig and whether those addresses are publicly identified or linked to a known team, checking the liquidity pool directly to see how much is in it and who holds the LP tokens, reviewing the holder list to see whether the top wallets are exchanges, team allocations, or unknown individual addresses, and searching for any official communication from the project about upgrade plans, vesting schedules, or liquidity lock commitments. None of this check constitutes financial advice, and the findings above should be treated as inputs to further research rather than a conclusion.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.