| Risk factor | Finding | Evidence | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sellable | Yes | Transfer simulation | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Buy tax | 0% | Contract | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Sell tax | 0% | Contract | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Admin mint | Not present | Contract | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Transfers pausable | Not present | Contract | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Address blacklist | Not present | Contract | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Upgradeable proxy | No | Contract | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Source verified | Yes | Block explorer | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Top-10 holders | 48.7% | Holder distribution | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Liquidity locked | No | LP holders | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Holders | 1653 | Token contract | 12 Oct 2026 |
| Deployed by | 0x0d9711…fa4b66 |
| Current owner | 0x89bad4…b2e129 |
| Holders | 1,653 |
| Rank | Address | Share |
|---|---|---|
| #1 · contract | 0xfc850f…b05917 | 20.06% |
| #2 | 0x708955…c62637 | 8.22% |
| #3 · contract | 0x7ff3ca…c9481e | 5.65% |
| #4 · Uniswap v4 pool · contract | 0x360e68…b9fb32 | 4.26% |
| #5 | 0x2e99bf…dfca5b | 3.28% |
This automated check of the ENA contract on Arbitrum found no honeypot behaviour: an actual sell was simulated and completed successfully, with buy and sell tax both reading 0% at the time of the check. The contract does not contain an admin mint function, so no detection of the ability to create new tokens out of thin air and dilute holders. No pause function was detected, meaning there is no mechanism visible in the code that would let an owner freeze transfers. No blacklist function was detected either, so nothing in the contract currently allows specific wallets to be blocked from trading. The contract is also not upgradeable through a proxy, which means the logic governing the token cannot be silently swapped out after you hold it, based on what was read on the date of this check. Two points stand out on the other side: the top 10 wallets hold 48.7% of total supply, which is a meaningful concentration — large holders selling at once can move the market sharply — and the liquidity backing this token is not locked, meaning whoever controls that liquidity position retains the technical ability to withdraw it from the pool.
It's worth being clear about what this score does not cover. This check reads contract mechanics: what the code permits an owner or privileged address to do, and what a holder is technically exposed to as a result. It says nothing about who is behind the project, how the token's economics are designed to play out over time, whether any legal or regulatory structure sits behind it, or what the team's actual intentions are. Verified source code and a clean set of findings describe the mechanism, not the people operating it or the promises made around it. A high score here is not a judgement on the project's legitimacy, future performance, or trustworthiness — it only reflects that certain adversarial contract patterns were not detected on the date of the check.
Before deciding anything, it's worth looking directly at who holds that liquidity position and under what terms, since unlocked liquidity sitting with a single wallet is a materially different situation than unlocked liquidity spread across a multisig with public commitments. Checking the identity and history of the top holders, looking for any public vesting or lock-up schedule, reviewing the project's own documentation and audit history if one exists, and checking whether the contract has had any ownership or admin-key changes since deployment would all add useful context that this mechanical check cannot provide.
Contracts change after they are checked. Tell us where to reach you and we will say when this one does. Free for three contracts, no account.
We checked 18 points out of 100.
The other 82 are where money is usually lost: who the team is, where the tokens sit, what the documents actually say, and what the project chose not to put on its front page.